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LOUIS G. TRYFONAS,

12427

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Louis G. Tryfonas, appeals the grand larceny conviction rendered against him.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Louis G. Tryfonas was convicted of grand larceny in
the District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen, presiding, on February 11, 1970. He
was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one
or more than ten years in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the grand larceny conviction
affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent accepts the statement of facts as made bv
the appellant except as hereafter noted.
·
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE CRIME OF
"LARCENY OF A COW" AS DEFINED BY
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-38-4 (1953) AND PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-4 (1953) defines the crime of
grand larceny :
"Grand larceny is committed in either of the
following cases:
(1) When the property taken is of value ex·
ceeding $50.
(2) When the property taken is from the per·
son of another.
( 3) When the property taken is a horse, mare,
colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep,
goat, mule, jack or jenny." (Emphasis added.)
The thrust of this section of the Code is to provide a
distinction between grand larceny and petit larceny as Jar·
ceny itself is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1 (1953).
There is no question raised as to whether or not there was
in fact a " ... felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading
or driving away the personal property of another." Id.

This is more than adequately shown by the facts in the
Record when considered in light of the presumption that
a prima facie case is made out when the person in possession of stolen property, " . . . fails to make a satisfactory
explanation." Id.
The question presented directly to the court on this
appeal is whether or not there was adequate evidence presented to establish the crime of larceny of a cow. This relates specifically to the determination that appellant committed a crime of sufficient severity so as to come within
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-4 (1953). The
intent of the legislature in enacting the provisions of the
grand larceny statute relating to livestock was examined
in In re Gannett, 11 Utah 283, 39 P. 496 (1895). There
the court said :
"It is evident that the legislature, by the enactment of 1886, intended to provide a punishment for
certain offenses against live stock, which were akin
to stealing, but technically were not larceny, and
which were not covered by the general law relating
to larceny." Id. at 289, 39 P. 497.

*

*

*

"It is quite apparent that it has been the settled

policy of the legislature to make live stock a subject
of grand larceny.... " Id. at 290, 39 P. 498.
The indication is clear that the legislature felt that
the taking of livestock and specifically a cow was a serious
enough offense that it should always constitute the crime
of grand larceny as opposed to petit larceny.

J

Appellant contends that a cow ceases to be a co,
v w1en
1
it is no longer alive. This distinction is frivolous in light
of the purpose of the grand larceny statute and in light
of the usefulness of a cow. The statutes' purpose has been
to punish those persons taking a cow with the same penalty
as those who would take property of a value in excess of
$50. The value of a cow does not come into question.
The usefulness of a cow in the hands of its true owner
ceases at the time the cow is taken whether it is taken dead
or alive. Certainly no distinction can be seen between stealing or killing and stealing from the standpoint of the true
owner. From the thief's viewpoint, the true utility of the
cow might be that of using it as meat or beef and not as a
source of milk or breeding. There can be no real distinctions made between taking a cow and killing it and taking
a cow and keeping it alive. In both cases, the true owner
is deprived of his property and the thief benefits from the
use of the cow no matter what he views that use to be.
Appellant contends that the rule of law in Utah is that
the evidence must prove that the cow be alive at the time
of the taking and that the evidence show that the defendant
actually killed the cow_ The holding in State v. Laub, 102
Utah 402, 131 P. 2d 805 (1942) does not in fact require
that such proof be made. The court said:
". . . [ W] here the anmal is killed as a means
of making the theft possible, the crime of grand
larceny is complete just as much as if it had been
loaded on a truck alive and taken away ... · If the
person seeking to steal it shot it in order to catch
it, the crime of grand larceny would be made out at

,,
~he

Lrnc

w 1·; taken into pcssession. The killing or
!wt the m;mner chosen to obtain posId. at 407, 131 P. 2d 807.

!~

shCJotii':~· was
1:e~c:;on.'

The rnl'i't indicat2<l t!1at foe killing of <• cow could be
the basi.c; i;-: ·· t 11e felonious taking in grand larceny, providing all ti 1 ~ c~c;nents of the crime were met. The death of
the animal diJ not affect the conviction for grand larceny.
AppeJlant mges that the killing of the cow actually
becomes an element of the crime under the Laub decision.
Sud1 a contention does not square with the holding of the
case. The defendant Laub and two others were convicted
of grand larceny after the evidence showed the following
facts.
"The evidence set out above almost conclusively
shows that someone killed a calf belonging to Charles
Foster and took the carcass. The attempt made to
destroy marks of identification on the hide and remains of the calf is inconsistent with any hypothesis
except that the person disposing of the hide, etc.
had a guilty mind and was trying to conceal his
crime. This calf was killed in the vicinity of RoundUp Flat on or about October 9, 1941.

*

*

*

" . . . They (the defendants) were all together
with Cannon in Round-Up Flat at or near the time
of the commission of the crime. They had in their
truck several burlap sacks - sacks similar to those
in which the remains of the calf were found. Their
conduct when they first saw the Trumans was one
of hesitancy, showing surprise and reluctance to be
discovered. They had fresh blood in quantity upon
their hands and clothes. Laub carried a rifle." Id.
at 408-409, 131 P. 2d 808. (Emphasis added.)
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If in fact the Laub decision requires that the animal
be killed by those taking the animal, the evidence in Laub
does not meet its own legal test. Circumstantially there
was an indication that Laub and his friends might have
killed the calf but the evidence in the case at bar is just as
strong in proving that Tryfonas in fact killed the cow.

Assuming that Laub requires that a killing be shown,
the following facts meet the same circumstantial evidence
test that Laub applied in finding a killing. Tryfonas was
seen dragging part of the cow away from the car as his
partner slammed the lid of the trunk ( T. 5) . Both Tryfonas
and his friend ran when seeing the red spot light (T. 5).
A rifle was found in the car (T. 22). Appellant Tryfonas,
after being advised of his rights, voluntarily called out,
"Merl, come on up. They have caught us" (T. 14). The
cow was later properly identified as belonging to someone
other than Tryfonas ( T. 36) .
The circumstantial evidence before the Court in this
case is very similar to that found in Laub. The conviction
for grand larceny was affirmed in Laub and should like·
wise be affirmed in the case at bar. This is especially true
when viewed in light of the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-38-1 (1953) which state that a prima facie case of
larceny is made out when a person is found with stolen
property and fails to make a satisfactory explanation.
It should also be pointed out that in an earlier Utah
case, State v. Church, 54 Utah 533, 182 P. 218 (1919), the

facts showed that Church was not present when his stepson

killed a steer. The defendant, Church, did aid in slaughtering and concealing the killing of the steer and was still conYictecl of larceny of a steer. With this case as precedent
for La11b, it would be foolish to suggest that proof must be
offered tn show that defendant actually killed the animal in
order to sustain a larceny conviction.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY AS TO WHAT ELEMENTS CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF "LARCENY OF A
COW" AS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-38-4 (1953).
Appellant contends in connection with Point I of his
brief that a cow must be alive or be killed by the defendant
in order to be a cow within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-38-4 (1953). Appellant urges this Court to require
that a jury be instructed with such a definition.
The contention made is without merit in light of the
distinctions made relating to the Laub case as discussed
in Respondent's Point I. The proper standards for jury
instructions were clearly set forth in the Church decision
relating directly to this area of the law. Counsel for the
defendant in Church urged that the jury was not properly
instructed and that the following jury instruction should
have been given.

.
"You are instructed that defendant would t
be guilty of grand larceny, the offense cl"1.<ergedn~f
he had nothing to do whether di1·ectly 01· indire~tly
with the steer, prior to its death, and at the immediate time of its killing, even though, after its death
he helped dress the same and appropriated wme of
the meat for his own use, for merely d1·e,·:sing the
animal and appropriating the meat is net grand
larceny on the part of the defendant unless he connived, aided, and abetted in its taking and killing."
State v. Church, 54 Utah 533, 540, 182 P. 218, 221
(1919).
The court found no error in refusing to submit such
an instruction to the jury. The conviction in Church was
affirmed.
Appellant urges that this Court require that a similar
jury instruction be submitted as was suggested in Church.
For the reasons previously explained regarding the killing
of a cow in connection with its taking such an irn;truction
should not be required in the case at bar. This would agree
entirely with the holding in the Church and Laub cases
as have been discussed.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to show
the commission of the crime of grand larceny. The grand
larceny statute treating animals as subjects of grand Jar·
ceny should be construed as specifying an alternative to
valuation made at the express will of the legislature.

The Laub and Church cases both fit squarely with the
facts of this case and their holdings should be binding on
this Court in affirming a conviction for grand larceny
where there was circumstantial evidence to show that
Tryfonas actually killed the cow.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

LAUREN N. BEASLEY

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

